The Gauntlet
Korea, Nov 28-30 1950
By October of 1950 it seemed that the Korean War, begun on 25 June 1950 with a massive surprise invasion of the Republic of Korea (South) by the North Korean People’s Army, was all but over. American and ROK forces had just managed to hold onto the Pusan Perimeter in August but by September 15th strong enough American and UN military forces had been gathered to launch two powerful counter-offensives by land and sea that soon became runaway successes. The North Korean capital of Pyongyang had fallen, the NKPA had virtually ceased to exist as an organized military force, and in places ROK and US forces had reached the Yalu River.
Completely ignoring all evidence that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had already joined the fight, General Douglas MacArthur announced and kicked off his “Home by Christmas” Offensive to take over all of North Korea. In spite of UN air supremacy, the Chinese had in fact already infiltrated some thirty CPLA divisions numbering well over 300,000 men into North Korea and were waiting to strike. When they did, their offensive completely destroyed some major UN units of up to divisional strength and sent the rest reeling southwards in retreat.
The U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry Division was one of the American units that was hit hard. Two Chinese Corps of six divisions had hit and decimated the two weak ROK divisions on the UN 8th Army’s far right, turning the line and outflanking the 2nd ID, which was soon under attack from multiple directions. Hoping to surround and cut off the 2nd ID completely, the PVA 114th Division infiltrated through the mountains to get behind the Americans and sever their only route of withdrawal, the road from Kuni-ri to Sunch’on.
All Chinese divisions of the era were heavy on manpower and small arms, but very light in heavy weapons and artillery while transport was virtually non-existent. In order to move rapidly through the rugged, roadless mountains, the 114th Division had to leave their few heavy weapons behind and rely entirely upon their organic small arms and light mortars.
The Chinese did not actually build physical roadblocks or obstacles on the road but instead created fireblocks. These consisted of hastily-dug field fortifications manned by troops firing small arms and machine guns. With the road on the valley floor, the Chinese could occupy the high ground on both sides of it and fire down upon it without fear of friendly fire casualties. As their small arms crossfire knocked out jeeps and trucks, the disabled vehicles themselves became roadblocks.
When the hard-pressed 2nd ID began its withdrawal, it was thought that there was only a single Chinese roadblock covered by a small number of troops. Instead, most of the 114th Division was dug in on the high ground on both sides of the road for a distance of a little over five miles. American GIs came to call this stretch of road as the “Gauntlet”.
It was the Chinese machine guns that wrecked the most havoc. The vast majority of them were emplaced at ranges of from 300 to 500 yards. The guns were positioned to fire at right angles to the road, generally limiting their fields of traverse to about 30-degrees, and since they were located hundreds of feet in elevation higher than the road itself they could only deliver plunging fire. Even so, their fire proved devastating. The first four American vehicles in the retreating column were tanks, which the Chinese did not open fire on. When the tanks reported no enemy contact, the groups or “serials” of soft-skinned wheeled vehicles started down the road behind them, at which point the Chinese opened up with everything they had.
Some light, mostly 60-mm mortars, were also employed, and the accuracy of the Chinese mortarmen was generally very good, but the troops moving on foot through the mountains had only been able to pack in a limited amount of mortar bombs. The 114th Division had a small handful of bazookas, but Marshall indicates that only ten or less bazooka rockets were fired at the 2nd Infantry Division’s vehicles. Nor did the Chinese forces possess or use any artillery or demolitions.
The Chinese infantry’s submachine guns, rifles, and light machine guns combined did not seem to contribute as much to the destruction as the 20-30 heavy machine guns used. These were primarily water-cooled, belt-fed Soviet M-1910 Maxim guns mounted on tripods or two-wheeled Sokolov mounts, firing the rimmed Russian/Soviet 7.62x54R cartridge.
The Chinese gunners seem to have been using standard Type D Heavy Ball, a boat-tailed, lead-core 185-grain FMJ bullet, along the with standard Type T 148-grain tracer bullet which had a higher muzzle velocity and was, despite its lighter weight, supposed to match the trajectory of the Type D ball out to 1,200 meters. No sources mention Chinese use of any kind of armor-piercing ammunition. Marshall’s official report on the action does mention a very limited use of “explosive bullets”, which most likely refers to the 160-grain Type ZP Incendiary Ranging Bullet. A cavity in the nose of the bullet, ahead of the lead core and contained within the full metal jacket, contained an incendiary mixture ignited by a high explosive primer. The old Soviet manuals say the Type ZP was used for fire adjustment and could be used against unarmored fuel tanks on vehicles and aircraft but also noted, “A bullet of this type, hitting personnel, has the same effect as an explosive bullet.”
Even with only ball ammo, the Chinese machine guns took a terrible toll. The U.S. 2nd Infantry Division suffered 4,037 casualties and lost most of its heavy weapons and approximately a third of its wheeled motor vehicles; the 5-mile stretch of road through the Gauntlet was littered with roughly 500 destroyed or disabled jeeps and trucks, the latter mainly 2-1/2-ton Deuce-and-a-Half 6x6s. Of the American vehicles that did manage to make it through the Gauntlet, Marshall noted that only one truck did not have any bullet holes in it. The Turkish Brigade, ambushed trying to open the southern end of the Gauntlet, lost fully 90% of its jeeps and trucks. It was reported that at least 80% of these vehicles had been knocked out solely by small arms and machine gun fire using 7.62x54R ball ammunition.
The aftermath of the 2nd Infantry Division running the Chinese “Gauntlet” at Kunu-ri; the road is littered with wrecked and burned-out jeeps, 2-1/2-ton trucks, artillery pieces, and even a Sherman tank.
Despite the lack of armor-piercing ammunition, Chinese 7.62x54R fire even destroyed numerous American light armored vehicles, primarily self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems that also delivered significant direct anti-personnel fire in the Korean War. These were the M16 “Quad .50” Multiple Gun Motor Carriage, based on the WWII M3 White halftrack, with a maximum of a half an inch (12.7mm) of armor on the sides and front, and the M19 Gun Motor Carriage, twin 40-mm Bofors AA guns mounted on the M24 Chaffee light tank chassis, with similar armor thicknesses on the hull and gun shields. Originally intended as anti-aircraft weapons, neither vehicle had overhead armor on the crew compartment or weapons turret, and both suffered heavily from Chinese ball-ammo machine gun fire fired from higher elevations.
Fast Forward to 5.56x45mm small arms and
Baghdad, Iraq, 2004
“Jason Gillis, a former army staff sergeant, first witnessed the M855’s shortcomings in 2004 on the streets of Baghdad. He was a squad leader with 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, on patrol when a vehicle began speeding toward his unit. After several warnings, ‘both of our M249s opened up instantly, forming a crisscross pattern of tracer that met at the vehicle’s engine compartment and windshield. Within seconds, riflemen and grenadiers were executing magazine changes while the vehicle kept rolling and finally stopped 10 meters from my lead troops,’ Gillis recalled in an email to Army Times. He is now a free-lance writer who often focuses on military small-arms issues. ‘Assuming the driver was most likely riddled beyond recognition, we were all astounded to see the driver emerge from the vehicle completely unscathed,’ Gillis wrote. ‘Closer inspection revealed that the M855 ammunition had failed to effectively penetrate the vehicles windshield despite the fact that over 400 rounds were expended at extremely close range and on target.’ Other soldiers say they like the M855 because it is lightweight, but wish it had more punch. ‘The idea of being able to carry 210 rounds [basic load] is quickly overshadowed by the fact that it takes more than one and even more than two rounds to drop the enemy,’ Staff Sgt. Charles Kouri, 82nd Airborne Division, told Army Times”
Yet another Iraq veteran offered this observation: “I have had the opportunity to fire an M249 using 62-grain M855 ball ammo into moving vehicles. While eventually having an effect upon the drivers/occupants, the 5.56mm round leaves much (original emphasis) to be desired as far as stopping a small pickup truck heading your way at high speed.”
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