(Rifles and Riflemen in the Revolution Part 4)
Lexington Green, April 19, 1775. To this day no one really knows for sure who fired the very first "shot heard 'round the world."
When the American Revolution burst
into open warfare on April 19, 1775, there had previously been some uneasy
confrontations between armed soldiers and patriots that had ended without
bloodshed. Both the British Army and the American Militia commanders were
understandably hesitant to fire the first shot that would spark an actual
shooting war.
The skirmish at Lexington Green began
as another face-off, with both sides hoping a mere show of force and
determination would prove sufficient. American Captain John Parker placed the
77 militiamen of his company in parade ground formation on Lexington Green, in
the open but blocking the road to Concord.
History credits him with the orders, “Stand your ground; don’t fire unless
fired upon, but if they mean to have a war, let it begin here.” The British
advance guard, consisting of companies of light infantry and marines totaling
around 240 men, arrived in town. The commanding officer, Major John Pitcairn,
rode forward on his horse with sword drawn and ordered the militia to disperse.
Captain Parker actually did order his
men to disperse and go home, but he had tuberculosis and his command voice did
not carry well in the confusion. Exactly who fired the first shot is still
debated today. Both sides blamed the other; the shot may have even come from
the crowd of as many as a hundred on-lookers who had gathered. No matter who
fired the shot, under such tense conditions it triggered an apparently
unordered volley from the front rank of British soldiers, soon followed by a
bayonet charge. With eight men killed and ten wounded, the surviving militia
fled the field.
After getting the soldiers and
marines back into ranks and under control, the British then proceeded to the main
objective, Concord,
where they intended to seize and destroy military stores reportedly gathered
there by the rebels. Around 250 local militia had gathered in Concord
but, seeing the British main column out-numbered them by 3-to-1, their
commander Colonel James Barrett prudently withdrew across the North Bridge
to a ridge where he could observe the area. The British searched Concord and found some
old dismounted cannon barrels, but the bulk of the American supplies had
already been removed. Seven companies crossed the North Bridge
and searched James Barrett’s farm; one company was left to secure the bridge
and two others were positioned nearby. The whole time Minutemen and militia
from Concord, Lincoln,
Acton and Bedford
continued to arrive, quickly swelling Barrett’s ranks to over 400 men.
Aware of the gunfire at Lexington and seeing smoke rising from Concord,
Colonel Barrett formed up his men with orders not to fire unless fired upon and
marched in them in column back down towards the North Bridge.
The three British light infantry companies, in total just under a hundred men
under the command of an inexperienced young captain named Walter Laurie,
gathered together and fell back across the bridge. As the Yankee militia
approached the bridge, a British soldier fired without orders, which in turn triggered
a ragged volley from the first rank which killed two and wounded four American
militia.
Near the head of the militia column, Major
John Buttrick of Concord
yelled, “Fire, for God's sake, fellow soldiers, fire!” The opposing sides were
only fifty yards apart as the first few ranks of militia opened fire on the
tightly packed British formation. The American musketry knocked down half of
the eight British officers and NCOs present, and killed three and wounded nine
enlisted men. Momentarily leaderless, the remaining British infantry broke and
ran back towards Concord.
The militiamen, stunned by their own success, milled indecisively for a bit,
then backed off and took up defensive positions behind a stone wall and on a
hilltop.
Now neither side fired a shot as the
four British light infantry companies returned from Barrett’s Farm and were met
by two companies of grenadiers coming from Concord. The British returned to that town
where the entire column re-consolidated and began its return march towards Boston at noon. All the
while, more militia poured in from the surrounding communities and countryside.
Militia tactics included "skulking" and swarming all along the road back to Boston.
The actual
“battle” was essentially one long, running ambush…a British officer later noted
they were surrounded by a “dispersed though adhering” ring of irregulars that
moved with them…and the Yankees’ actions were remarkably similar to the
“swarming” technique used by some modern-day insurgents. Using the so-called
“skulking” tactics of the Indians in hiding behind stone walls, trees, and
buildings, they were able to pour musket fire at the column of British regulars
on the road while exposing little of themselves as targets for return fire.
As
British Lieutenant John Barker saw the action: “We were fired on from all
sides, but mostly from the rear, where people had hid themselves in houses till
we passed and then fired. The country was an amazing strong one, full of hills,
woods, stone walls, etc., which the rebels did not fail to take advantage of,
for they were all lined with people who kept an incessant fire upon us, as we
did too upon them, but not with the same advantage, for they were so concealed
there was hardly any seeing them. In this way, we marched…miles, their numbers
increasing from all parts, while our was reducing by deaths, wounds, and fatigue;
and we were totally surrounded with such an incessant fire as it’s impossible
to conceive; our ammunition was likely near expended.”
The
dispersed British light infantry flankers constantly strove to drive the rebels
back from the main column with ball and bayonet, and inflicted the lion’s share
of American casualties, but the traditional European volley fire from the main
column itself proved ineffective. An American militiaman recalled, “…they faced
about suddenly and fired a volley of musketry upon us. They overshot; and no
one to my knowledge was injured by the fire. The fire was immediately returned
by the Americans, and two British soldiers fell dead at a little distance from
each other in the road near the brook.” One British officer assessed that the
ineffectiveness of the regulars’ volley fire only served to encourage the
rebels. “This [fire] gave the rebels more confidence as they soon found that
notwithstanding there was so much, they suffered but little from it.”
By
the end of the battle, a thousand-man British relief column with two pieces of
artillery rushed out from Boston to bring in the
battered remnants of the original Lexington
column, which had suffered the most casualties and was almost out of
ammunition. Without these reinforcements, they might have been decimated
entirely. As it was, the British reported losses of 73 men killed, 174 wounded,
and 53 missing (with a high percentage of the casualties being officers) while
the Americans lost 49 men killed, 39 wounded, and 5 missing.
Beginning
with Christopher Ward’s 1952 War of the
Revolution, in which he stated that, “only one bullet out of 300 found it
mark,” it became popular for historians to belittle the “myth” of American
marksmanship at Concord
and pronounce the militia to be terrible shots. Even assuming Ward’s numbers
are correct, as we saw in Part 1, in traditional European battles of the period
it was a rule of thumb that a man’s body weight in lead had to be fired for
every casualty inflicted, with French and Prussian generals estimating that
anywhere from 3,000 to 10,000 musket balls needing to be fired for every man
hit. Viewed in such light, the militia’s shooting on April 19th doesn’t look
bad at all.
Even French concluded:
“Nor need it be supposed that there was criticism of the provincial fire at the
time. Measured by the European standard of those days, it was above the average, and there was not a veteran
in that flight who complained that the American fire was not sufficiently hot.
Lieutenant Carter called it a ‘heavy and well-directed fire.’ Mackenzie,
Barker, De Berniere, held it in respect. Percy wrote of the ‘incessant fire, which
like a moving circle surrounded & fold us wherever we went.’ By every standard
of those days, the American fire was formidable. Certainly no one who
experienced it asked to have it bettered. It was the preparation for the fire
of Bunker Hill, which for deadliness exceeded
anything previously known in warfare.”
After
Concord, a stalemate ensued as the British
forces dug in around Boston
while the American forces surrounded the town and did likewise. Almost two
months passed before the Americans made the next move, occupying and digging in
on Breed’s Hill (rather than the intended objective of Bunker
Hill) under cover of darkness on the night of June 16, 1775.
The British reacted aggressively to push the Americans from
the hill before they could become solidly entrenched, but it was late afternoon
on June 17th before the first assault actually went in. There were
in total some three thousand regulars, including the more elite light infantry
and grenadier companies as assault troops, led by General William Howe himself.
These professional soldiers exuded confidence and were certain that the
Colonial “untrained rabble” could never stand against British regulars.
A force of 1,200 American militiamen from Connecticut, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts and Rhode
Island awaited entrenched atop Breed’s Hill.
They were nominaly under the overall command of Massachusetts Colonel William
Prescott, but in practice the entire American chain of command was rather
muddled. Fortunately unknown to the British, the Americans were also suffering
from a severe army-wide shortage of gunpowder; some Colonial troops were issued
only fifteen rounds worth of powder and shot before the battle. Conversely,
British soldiers were issued 36 paper-wrapped cartridges for the day, and even
that total would grow quickly as the war progressed. Despite their shortcomings,
the militiamen dug in and waited.
Popular legend attributed Colonel William Prescott with the instructions, "Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes."
To the surprise of many, the “untrained rabble” of the
Colonial militia stood their ground against the well-trained professional
soldiers. Legend has it that either Israel Putnam or William Prescott gave the
famous order, “Don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes.” Individual veterans
recalled, probably more realistically, orders that included: “Fire low.” “Aim
at their waistbands.” “Pick off the commanders.” “Aim at the handsome coats.”
On the left flank, colorful Colonel John Stark, whose later toast of “Live Free
or Die” would one day become New
Hampshire’s state motto, was said to have driven in a
stake roughly 120 feet (40 yards) in front of his line, then turned to his
militiamen and said, “There! Don’t a man fire till the Redcoats come up to that
stake. If he does, I’ll knock him down.”
A few premature shots
were discharged by nervous individuals, but for the most part the American militia hunkered down
and waited until the lines of British infantry were at such close range that
even musket fire would be accurate. From behind cover and resting their
muskets, they took deliberate aim and delivered devastating close-range blasts
of small arms fire that inflicted heavy casualties and broke up the first two
British assaults.
The action was described by one of the British officers who
took part:
“Our men advanced with great confidence, expecting an easy
victory…
“As we approached, an incessant stream of fire poured from
the rebel lines. It seemed a continual sheet of fire for near thirty minutes.
Our Light Infantry were served up in companies against the grass fence without
being able to penetrate. Indeed, how could we penetrate? Most of our Grenadiers
and Light Infantry, the moment of presenting themselves lost three-fourths and
many nine-tenths, of their men. Some had only eight and nine men a company
left, some only three, four and five.
“On the left, Pigot was staggered and actually retreated.”
Howard Pyle's iconic 1879 Battle of Bunker Hill has some inaccuracies (British infantry had adopted a two-rank open-order formation in North America prior to the end of the French & Indian Wars) but portrays well the discipline and bravery of the regulars...and the cost.
New Hampshire Captain Henry Dearborn, who would one day
retire as a major general after the War of 1812, commanded a small militia company
on Breed’s Hill. He later wrote:
“Every platoon officer
was engaged in discharging his own musket, and left his men to fire as they
pleased, but never without a sure aim at some particular object, which was more
destructive than any mode which could have been adopted with troops who were not inured to discipline, and never had
been in battle, but were still familiar with the use of arms, from boyhood, and
each having his peculiar manner of loading and firing, which had been practised upon for years, with the same gun ; any attempt to control
them by uniformity and system, would have rendered their fires infinitely less
fatal to the enemy.”
“Our men were intent on
cutting down every officer they could distinguish in the British line. When any
of them discovered one he would instantly exclaim, ‘there,’ ‘see that officer,’
‘let us have a shot at him,’ when two or three would fire at the same moment ;
and as our soldiers were excellent marksmen and rested their muskets over the
fence, they were sure of their object.”
Dearborn also noted the
ineffectiveness of the British volley fire. “The fire of the enemy was so badly
directed, I should presume that forty-nine balls out of fifty passed from one
to six feet over our heads, for I noticed an apple-tree, some paces in the rear,
which had scarcely a ball in it from the ground as high as a man's head, while
the trunk and branches above were literally cut to pieces.”
The third assault by the British finally carried the day as
the Americans atop Breed’s Hill fired their
last few shots and ran out of ammunition. As the British infantry broke into
the trenches with fixed bayonets, the defenders, very few of whom had bayonets
of their own, finally broke and fled from the breastworks. On the American
left, the two hundred New Hampshire militiamen under Colonel Stark, who had
been the last American reinforcements to arrive just prior to the battle,
conducted an orderly, fighting retreat that allowed the remainder of the
colonials to escape intact. Even British General John Burgoyne grudgingly
admitted the retreat was, “…no flight; it was even conducted with bravery and
military skill.”
The British took the hill and won the battle, but it was an
extremely costly and Pyrrhic victory, the single most costly battle of the war
in terms of British casualties. General Sir Henry Clinton, who had gathered up
scattered British survivors and the walking wounded to personally lead the
third, final assault, confided in his journal the battle was, “A dear brought
victory, another such would have ruined us.”
Even though armed almost entirely with the same smoothbore
muskets as their opponents, the militia’s close-range fire had been accurate
and devastating. Once more a very high proportion of officers, 81 in all, had
been singled out and shot down, with 19 of them killed and 62 wounded. Total
British casualties exceeded a thousand, more than a third of the attacking
force; 226 killed and 828 wounded. The Americans lost a total of around 450
casualties including 140 killed, 280 wounded, and 30 captured, with most of these casualties inflicted during
the retreat.
Even with muskets, marksmanship had made the difference and
one has to wonder what the fate of the third assault might have been if the
patriots had not been so woefully short on ammunition.