(Rifles & Riflemen in the Revolution Part 6)
Boston Besieged: 1775
At the beginning of the American Revolutionary War, the
rebels’ siege of British-held Boston had
already lasted nearly three months by the time the frontier riflemen began to
arrive even though, as we have seen, they covered vast distances in a surprisingly
short time. During that period the pickets and outposts of both the British and
American armies had settled down opposite each other just out of musket range.
Even the cannon dueled sparingly.
Unknown to the
British, as it was perhaps Washington’s
most closely guarded secret, the Continental Army was woefully short of
gunpowder. Even after the capture of Fort
Ticonderoga and Henry Knox’s Herculean
journey dragging 59 cannon through the wilderness to Boston, the Americans still lacked the powder
to put their new artillery to work. Though a call went out through the Colonies
for whatever powder was available, such shortages would haunt the Continental
Army throughout the war. At one point during the Siege of Boston, Washington
had only enough powder to issue nine rounds per man, while a British soldier’s
basic issue was 36 paper-wrapped cartridges.
Now, however,
General Washington could unleash the riflemen upon the cooped-up British
garrison while burning only a tiny fraction of the powder an artillery
bombardment would. Long-range sniping could only inflict a relatively small total
of casualties when it came to actual numbers in the grand scheme of things but,
perhaps even more important, it could wage a form of psychological warfare upon
the enemy’s confidence and morale, both in Boston itself and even back home in
England.
On August 5th, at
Washington’s headquarters in Cambridge, the canny general arranged for a
deliberate demonstration of skill by the frontier riflemen at an event attended
by several units of New England militiamen and a large crowd of public
spectators which, Washington knew full well, would include a few Loyalist spies
who would pass along what they witnessed to the British in Boston. Washington’s Surgeon General,
Dr. Thacher, noted in his journal, “At a review, a company of them [riflemen],
while on a quick advance, fired their balls into objects of seven inches
diameter, at the distance of two hundred and fifty yards.” Against this trick
of cutting down 7-inch wooden posts at 250 yards, recall again that even the
most expert marksman had a less than 50/50 chance of hitting a man at 100 yards
with the conventional smoothbore military musket of the era.
Initially, the sniping of the frontier riflemen proved to be
a great success. Unsuspecting British soldiers who had formerly been safe in
exposing themselves in their fieldworks little more than a stone’s throw away
from the rebel positions were suddenly falling at the echo of distant rifle
shots. Sentries, reconnaissance parties, and officers in particular were
singled out by the riflemen.
Captain James Chambers of the Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment
wrote from Cambridge
on August 13, 1775 that as soon as his company arrived on the 7th they
had immediately gone to view the British lines. “Whilst
I was standing there, some of our riflemen slipped down the hill, about a
gun-shot to the left of us, and began firing. The regulars returned it without
hurting our men. We thought we saw one of the red coats fall. Since the
riflemen came here, by the latest accounts from Boston, there have been forty-two killed and
thirty-eight prisoners taken at the light-house, twelve of the latter tories. Amongst
the killed are four captains, one of them a son of a lord, and worth £40,000 a
year, whose name I cannot recollect. The riflemen go where they please, and
keep the regulars in continual hot water.”
On August 18th, a letter from a rifle
company officer at Cambridge appeared in the Pennsylvania Journal saying: “The
riflemen from York
County have annoyed the
regulars very much. By a gentleman who left Boston yesterday, we hear that Captains
Percival and Sabine, of the marines, Captain Johnson of the royal Irish, and
Captain Le Moine of the Train, were killed on Monday. Captain Chetwyn, son of
Lord Chetwyn, is mortally wounded. The number of privates killed this week we
have not heard. The regulars have thrown up a breastwork across the neck at the
foot of Bunker’s Hill, to secure their sentries and advanced guards. Yesterday
Captain Morgan arrived from Virginia
with his company of riflemen; but they are grown so terrible to the mercenaries
that nothing is to be seen from their breastworks but a hat.”
Soon to be Colonel Robert Magaw wrote on August
13, 1775: “It was diverting some days ago to stand on our Ramparts on Prospect
Hills & see Half a Dozen Rifle Men go down to the Water side, & from
Behind Stone Walls, Chimneys, etc., pop at their floating batteries, at about
300 yards distance—‘tis said we killed several. A few Shots from the Rifles
always brought on a fire from the floating Batteries & Bunker’s Hill, where
the enemy are entrenched, but without any other effect than to afford us
amusement, as they seldom knew where to fire, & when they did their great
Guns threw the balls so wild and uncertain that there is very little Danger.”
Although the artillery of the day could indeed
slash great swathes of casualties through closely-ranked infantry formations,
especially with grapeshot and canister, against individual “skulkers” sniping
from under concealment and behind cover the cannon tended to roar futilely.
Since the riflemen fired from well beyond musket range, however, only the big
guns had enough range to reach them, and a great deal of British powder and
shot was wasted in trying to silence them.
As the siege of Boston dragged on and
supplies within the city began to run low, on November 9th the
British decided to mount an amphibious hit-and-run raid to capture a herd of
beef cattle being kept by the American Army at a farm on a grassy spit of land
called Lechmere Point; the point actually became an island at high tide. A
company of red-coated light infantry attempted to row ashore in approximately
twenty open long boats, covered by long-range cannon fire from three separate
shore batteries as well as the guns of a Royal Navy frigate hovering only 300
yards offshore. Only six American riflemen were guarding the stock on Lechmere
Point when the British appeared, but Colonel Thompson raced to the scene with
his Pennsylvania Riflemen, encamped nearby.
Lieutenant Colonel Hand
participated in the action and wrote a first-hand account of it in a letter to
his wife dated November 10, 1775:
"I give you the particulars of the fun our regiment had yesterday. About one, p. m., a number of regulars, taking advantage of a high tide, landed from twenty boats on Lechmere Point to carry off some cattle. Six men of our regiment were on the point to take care of our horses; they did their utmost, and partly effected it. One poor fellow was taken; he was of Capt. Ross' company. I think his name was Burke. When the alarm was given, Col. Thompson was at Cambridge. I had gone to Watertown to receive the regiment's pay, but thanks to good horses, we arrived in time to march our regiment, which was the first ready, though the most distant of our brigade. Col. Thompson, who arrived before we had crossed the water, with
thirteen men only of Ross' company, but not being supported by the musqueteers, before I could get up with the remainder of our regiment of duty, returned, and met Major Magaw and myself on the causeway; the whole then passed with the utmost diligence, up to our middles in water. David Ziegler, who acts as adjutant, tumbled over the bridge into ten or twelve feet water; he got out safe, with the damage of his rifle only. As
soon as the battalion had passed the defile, we divided them into two parties, part of Capt. Chambers,' Capt. Miller's, and Lowdon's, with Major Magaw and Col. Thompson, marched to the right of the hill, with part of Cluggage's, Nagel's, and Ross.' I took the left, as the enemy had the superiority of numbers, and the advantage of rising ground, with a stone wall in front,
and a large barn on their right and flank, aided by a heavy fire of large grape-shot from their shipping and batteries. We had reason to expect a warm reception; but to the disgrace of British arms, be it spoken, by the time we had gained the top of the hill, they had gained their boats, and rowed off. We had but one man wounded, I believe mortally, by a swivel ball,
Alexander Creighton, of Ross' company.”
"I give you the particulars of the fun our regiment had yesterday. About one, p. m., a number of regulars, taking advantage of a high tide, landed from twenty boats on Lechmere Point to carry off some cattle. Six men of our regiment were on the point to take care of our horses; they did their utmost, and partly effected it. One poor fellow was taken; he was of Capt. Ross' company. I think his name was Burke. When the alarm was given, Col. Thompson was at Cambridge. I had gone to Watertown to receive the regiment's pay, but thanks to good horses, we arrived in time to march our regiment, which was the first ready, though the most distant of our brigade. Col. Thompson, who arrived before we had crossed the water, with
thirteen men only of Ross' company, but not being supported by the musqueteers, before I could get up with the remainder of our regiment of duty, returned, and met Major Magaw and myself on the causeway; the whole then passed with the utmost diligence, up to our middles in water. David Ziegler, who acts as adjutant, tumbled over the bridge into ten or twelve feet water; he got out safe, with the damage of his rifle only. As
soon as the battalion had passed the defile, we divided them into two parties, part of Capt. Chambers,' Capt. Miller's, and Lowdon's, with Major Magaw and Col. Thompson, marched to the right of the hill, with part of Cluggage's, Nagel's, and Ross.' I took the left, as the enemy had the superiority of numbers, and the advantage of rising ground, with a stone wall in front,
and a large barn on their right and flank, aided by a heavy fire of large grape-shot from their shipping and batteries. We had reason to expect a warm reception; but to the disgrace of British arms, be it spoken, by the time we had gained the top of the hill, they had gained their boats, and rowed off. We had but one man wounded, I believe mortally, by a swivel ball,
Alexander Creighton, of Ross' company.”
According to another account, the
British managed to capture only ten beeves at a cost of 17 men killed and an
unknown number wounded. In addition to Creighton being killed, the Americans
also lost one man captured, one of the original six guards. At least some
reports allege that the sole POW in question had been heavily imbibing in
strong drink at the time (i.e. was drunk off his ass) and was thus rather easy for
the light infantrymen to catch.
Accounts of the martial prowess of the frontier riflemen had continued
to grow rapidly long before the skirmish on Lechmere Point. On August 6, 1776,
the Pennsylvania Gazette reported, “…the
riflemen picked off ten men in one day, three of whom were Field-Officers, that
were reconnoitering; one of them was killed at the distance of 250 yards.” When
the Pennsylvania Packet ran the same
story, the editor embellished it a bit, claiming that the officer was killed at
250 yards, “when only half of his head was seen.”
The tales continued to grow, each editor adding a bit to the
original report, until some of them became rather improbable. A few days later,
the Pennsylvania Gazette ran a story
claiming that the frontier riflemen had, “…killed three men on board a ship at Charlestown ferry, at the
distance of full half a mile.” Later, some writers even attributed this feat entirely
to the work of a single rifleman.
A half a mile equates to 880 yards. Assuming an initial
muzzle velocity of 1,600 feet per second, at such ranges a typical .45-caliber
round ball projectile would be traveling around 200 feet per second and
delivering roughly the equivalent of a modern .177-caliber air rifle in
foot-pounds of striking energy. If the rifle was zeroed at a hundred yards, as
was typical, the rifleman would have needed to aim 440 feet high to hit such a
distant target.
Regardless the newspapers' tall tales, embellishments or outright fabrications (which the media proudly continues to use to this very day) to the
rank-and-file British soldier in Boston,
armed with a Brown Bess smoothbore musket that was only moderately accurate to 75 yards, seeing his commanders and
comrades fall to single rifle balls delivered from 200-300 yards was a rather
disheartening and unnerving experience. After the initial surprise and spate of
casualties, the furor over riflemen soon began to die down as the British
fighting men in Boston
simply kept their heads down and didn’t expose themselves from behind their
breastworks, and actual casualties from rifle fire became fewer and fewer. As early as
September 11th, a letter from an American rifleman at Cambridge appeared in Gaine’s Mercury complaining that, “There
has not a random shot of a rifleman done any execution lately, worth
mentioning.”
The psychological and propaganda
damage, however, was not so readily negated. No less than the Boston
garrison’s commander General Lord Howe complained back to London about the “terrible guns of the
rebels” during the siege, and another British officer referred to American
rifles as “cursed twisted guns, the most fatal window-and-orphan makers in the
world.”
Soon, even the heavy British
casualties at Bunker Hill were being blamed on
the riflemen, although none of them had even been present at that particular
battle. One British officer went so far as to claim that each rifleman was
attended by two other men who did nothing but reload for him so that the
marksman had only to aim and fire as fast as a weapon could be put into his
hand: “…and this is the real cause of so many of our brave officers falling,
they being singled out by these murderers, as they must appear to be in the
eyes of every thinking man.”
A rather inaccurate depiction of the dreaded American riflemen from a period British newspaper...the media has a long and proud tradition of just making things up when they lack anything so trivial as facts and information.
A Philadelphia printer wrote to an English
publisher a letter which appeared in the London
Chronicle of 17 August 1775. “This province has raised 1000 riflemen, the
worst of whom will put a ball into a man’s head at the distance of 150 or 200
yards; therefore advise your officers who shall hereafter come out to America to settle their affairs in England
before their departure.”
In Great Britain, American riflemen
were even being openly discussed in the halls of the English Parliament, with
one legislator inquiring, “…about those strange rifled arms used with such
deadly certainty by several regiments of the American army.” Edmund Burke, the
eloquent if sometimes long-winded champion of the American colonies, delivered
a particularly scalding invective, mentioning Generals Washington, Lee and
Putnam and exclaiming, “These men know much more of your army than your return
can give them. They coop it up, besiege it, destroy it, crush it. Your officers
are swept off by the rifles if they show their noses!”
When a thousand British Army
reinforcements bound for America were reviewed by the King at Wimbleton common
on March 19, 1776, The Scots Magazine
observed, “The officers and soldiers were dressed in the same uniforms; as ‘tis
said, all the officers serving in America are to be dressed, because the
riflemen take aim at officers.”
In December 1775, the British
government finalized the first treaty that would allow them to “contract”
auxiliary troops from the various allied German States of the Holy
Roman Empire. More than 30,000 German troops would eventually
serve with the British Army in America
during the Revolutionary War. Since the first and the largest number of these
auxiliaries came from Hessen-Kassel, the Americans would come to universally
refer to all German troops as “Hessians.”
From the German princes the British
government sought to employ as many Jägers
or Chasseurs as possible. These were
woodsmen, armed with Jäger rifles and specially trained in skirmishing. One
English Parliamentarian explained, “The settlers from the backwoods of America
used their hunting rifles with so much effect that the only effective rejoinder
was to pit rifle against rifle; for this purpose Jägers were recruited on the Continent."
An account in the Constitutional Gazette in May of 1776
said: “Government have sent over to Germany to engage 1,000 men called Jagers,
people brought up to the use of the rifle barrel guns in boar hunting. They are
amazingly expert. Every petty prince who hath forests, keeps a number of them,
and they are allowed to take apprentices, by which means they are a numerous body
of people. These men are intended to act in the next campaign in America,
and our ministry plume themselves much in the thought of their being a complete
match for the American riflemen.”
Like the frontiersmen, the Jägers’
rifles lacked bayonets so they were issued a small, straight hunting sword
called a Hirshfanger with a 14-inch
blade and an overall length of two feet. The Jägers were also, however, trained
in conventional line tactics as well as skirmishing and, according to the
diaries of Jäger Captain Johann Ewald, usually operated in close conjunction
with a company of grenadiers with muskets and bayonets.
As will later be examined, the
British Army would adopt some rifles of its own. A thousand Pattern 76 rifles
would eventually serve in America.
These were conventional Jäger-influenced muzzle-loading rifles designed to
shoot a patched .615-inch carbine ball and were issued only to a few small,
specialized units and to the ten best marksmen in each line regiment.
The other British rifle, the Ferguson, was an
innovative breech-loader that had the potential to be a real “game-changer” but
never saw much service primarily because the manufacturing technology of the
era made its production extremely slow and very expensive. This was the
handiwork of Captain Patrick Ferguson, whose knowledge of and abilities with
rifles surpassed even George Hanger’s expertise. While muzzle-loading rifles
and muskets pretty much had to be loaded in the standing position, the
breech-loading Ferguson
rifle could be loaded in any position and could easily achieve a then unheard
of firing rate of six rounds per minute.
In the meantime, back in the
Colonies, another much darker side of the frontier riflemen was being revealed
in the Continental Army bivouacs around Cambridge.
The rifle companies had their own separate camps, were paid more than the
ordinary militiamen, and, as elite units, were excused from the more tedious
aspects of military service, such as working parties and guard duty. This special treatment soon
bred resentment among the rank and file soldiers and militiamen of the other army units encamped nearby.
The churlish behavior of many of the riflemen
themselves hurt their own cause as well. Skirmishes against the enemy had
become few and far between, and a lack of targets led snipers to attempt
ridiculously long shots that proved utterly ineffective and, in the long run,
began to negate British fear of the rifle. Their egos bloated by all the media
hype about their prowess, some of the enlisted men grew bored, sullen and
insolent, becoming in some cases almost as petulant as children. Even George
Washington himself complained that, “there is no restraining men’s tongues, or
pens, when charged with a little vanity, as in the accounts given of, or rather
by, the riflemen.”
Restraint and discipline, whether
self or military induced, had never been a strong point amongst the
frontiersmen in general and the Scotch-Irish in particular. Theodore Roosevelt
in The Winning of the West noted that
when such men gathered to fight Indians on the frontier, not even their own
officers could truly “command” their independent charges.
“There was everywhere a
rude military organization, which included all the able-bodied men of the community.
Every settlement had its colonels
and captains; but these officers, both in their training and in the authority they exercised, corresponded much more nearly to Indian chiefs than
to the regular army men whose titles they bore. They had no means whatever of enforcing their orders, and their tumultuous and disorderly levies of sinewy riflemen were hardly as well disciplined as the Indians themselves. The superior officer could advise, entreat, lead, and influence his men, but he could not command them, or, if he did, the men obeyed him only just so far as it suited them. If an officer planned a scout or campaign, those who thought proper accompanied him, and the others stayed at home, and even those who went out came back if the fit seized them, or perchance followed the lead of an insubordinate junior officer whom they liked better than they did his superior.”
and captains; but these officers, both in their training and in the authority they exercised, corresponded much more nearly to Indian chiefs than
to the regular army men whose titles they bore. They had no means whatever of enforcing their orders, and their tumultuous and disorderly levies of sinewy riflemen were hardly as well disciplined as the Indians themselves. The superior officer could advise, entreat, lead, and influence his men, but he could not command them, or, if he did, the men obeyed him only just so far as it suited them. If an officer planned a scout or campaign, those who thought proper accompanied him, and the others stayed at home, and even those who went out came back if the fit seized them, or perchance followed the lead of an insubordinate junior officer whom they liked better than they did his superior.”
Riflemen "recreating" in bivouac at Cambridge, 1775: Some things never change in the infantry.
By September, the reputation of the
frontier riflemen had grown almost sinister in the Colonial Army camps. Tempted
by rich bounties the British were offering for turncoats who would bring with
them their rifled barreled guns, some even deserted to the enemy. Virginia riflemen under
Colonel William Thompson twice broke into the guardhouse to release friends
being held on minor disciplinary charges. One Sunday, the adjutant clapped a
popular sergeant in the guardhouse for neglect of duty and, when another
malcontent riflemen began stirring up the other men to break the sergeant out,
he too was clapped in irons and confined as well. After dinner that evening, a
mob of riflemen broke the two men out of the guardhouse. The colonel and
several officers arrested the ring-leader again and escorted him to the
Continental Army’s Main Guard at Cambridge.
In less than a half an hour, more than thirty riflemen with loaded weapons had
gathered in a mob and were threatening to break into the Main Guard by force.
After reinforcing the guardhouse’s
contingent heavily with nearly five hundred militiamen bearing loaded muskets
with fixed bayonets, Generals Washington and Knox personally confronted the
mutineers directly, berating and shaming them into dispersing. Considering that
mutiny could be punishable by death, Washington
handed down rather lenient punishment when the ring-leaders of this mob were
court-martialed; mainly short jail terms and fines. The real punishment came
from the shame and disgust of their comrades and peers as even Charles Lee
damned them and General Washington himself exclaimed he wished they had never
come. The riflemens' special status as a whole was revoked along with their
exemption from fatigue details and camp duties.
Frontier riflemen were obviously never
going to be spit-and-polish garrison troops fit to perform dog and pony shows in front of visiting foreign dignitaries. It also should have been obvious
that with their slow-loading rifles and lack of bayonets, they would not fare
well in set-piece close-order conventional European-style battles against
British regulars. That lesson, however, would have to be learned the hard way…and
more than once…before it finally became obvious to the fledgling American Army’s
leadership.